There are plenty of accusations that the WTO either does not prevent or actually promotes environmental damage1 There are three main strands of criticism.
Both 1 and 2 appear to be practical issues but I feel primarily relate to the question of having NTBs and their relation to domestic environmental regulation and so will be dealt with here. Initially it will be helpful to focus on the bigger issue of the environment and international trade in general and then to focus on the specific issue of the WTO. Issue 3 is better dealt with in the section on the WTO’s free trade philosophy and the associated economic issues and will not be addressed here.
First let me provide a few illustrative examples of trade issues that involve the environment. These issues arose in disputes and some of them come from disputes relating to the GATT before the WTO came into existence. These summaries are derived from [3d], [1:398ff]
We are considering the use of trade policy to achieve environmental ends. The discussion consists of two stages. First we establish the grounds for using trade policy for environmental ends. Then we discuss the tensions between such restrictions and the free trading ideal and the balance that should be struck. Following [1:Chpt 15] We first distinguish between the use of trade policy (normally restrictions on trade)
2b: The competitiveness justification. In my view this is a very weak justification for the use of trade restrictions. The central problem that occurs with this kind of justification is the establishment of an appropriate set of objective environmental standards and of measuring compliance with them. Without such objective benchmarks the implicit assumption is that the domestic country’s standards are optimal both domestically and globally which is by no means clearly true. Second the actual competitive disadvantage as a consequence of environmental regulation may in fact be very small (or even an advantage rather than a disadvantage) and in any case is very difficult to calculate (see [2] for an in depth discussion of this very issue). Moreover even if we lived in a world of completely harmonized environmental standards different countries would not face the same costs of compliance due to the widely differing social, technological, demographic and geographic situations. These factors not only make the competitiveness argument extremely difficult and costly to implement but also make it particularly susceptible to protectionist abuse. Thus one is led to conclude that this is not an argument that should be considered in justifying the use of trade restrictions.2 for a further discussion particularly relating to wages for unskilled workers)
1: The use of trade measures to protect the domestic environment of the importing state. Here we are on much sounder ground. As long as the restriction is pursued in a evenhanded manner (i.e. the principle or regulation justifying the trade restriction is being applied equally to the domestic market) it is, in my view, perfectly legitimate to use trade restrictions to pursue environmental ends (however see following paragraphs for discussion of choice of policy instruments in the case of alternatives and of the trade off between trade restrictions and the principle of open trade).
2a: Use of trade restrictions to alter the environmental policies of other states for environmental reasons. What justification’s can their be for interference in another state’s affairs in this manner (other than straightforward paternalism of the kind ‘We know better’ which is unlikely to cut much ice with those upon whom these restrictions are imposed)? There are the following reasons: (following [1:422])
Thus there are several good justifications for using trade policy to intervene in the environmental policies of other states. However there are several qualifications of this conclusion. First is the question of whether economic sanctions are an effective way of pursuing this goal compared to alternatives such as negotiation or eco-labelling3. Second is the issue of trade off between this ability to sanction and the effect of this on the trading system’s integrity. This general issue is dealt with below and it is to this that we now turn.
The (WTO based) international trading system is based on several key principles:
Environmental trade restrictions conflict with all 3 of these principles:
Point 1 is not a significant issue since we have shown there are good reasons for treating these environmentally based trade restrictions as exceptions to the general rule. Points 2 and 3 provide greater difficulties particularly as it is these principles which guard against protectionist manipulation of the rules 4. The best solution to this tension is, in my view, to provide in international agreements:
This prevents protectionist abuse while at the same time providing real and substantive methods of dealing with important and serious environmental concerns. This will mean that there are limitations on a country’s ability to pursue environmental ends by trade policy solely through its domestic legislative process. This is something that is often upsetting to environmental campaigners (particularly in North America) who view it as unwarranted restriction of democratic legislation. Unfortunately, in my view, this is a trade off that must be made for the greater long-term health of the international trading system. Moreover it is to be hoped that these environmental goals can be vigorously pursued both through other methods than sanctions and in a suitable international arena 5.
The WTO as can be seen does concern itself directly with the environment. However it must be acknowledged that the progress is slow. Why is this? Simply put, it is that many countries, especially poorer, developing ones, do not want any increasing environmental regulation. For example on eco-labelling, something strongly supported by developed countries such as Germany, there has been little progress because of the opposition of developing countries. For they see it as being indirectly discriminatory (the bureaucracy and tracing required is much a greater burden on a less developed country than on a developed one) and perhaps also directly opposed to their interests (in that eco-friendly farming methods such as organic farming are more widely adopted and promoted in the developed world at present). It is also that on the trade agenda environment figures a fair way below other concerns, particularly those seen as having direct economic affects - things such as agricultural protectionism and trade in services.
Many environmental issues had already arisen in connection with GATT and the associated disputes. Thus when the WTO came into existence a special Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) was created in 1995. Its mandate is:
(For more information see [3])
See specific section on WTO website [3c]. In particular Article XX of GATT:
Last Updated: 14-Nov-2002
Created: 11-Apr-2002
IP Policy
Two examples among many being:
The effect on employment, particularly for unskilled labour, in developed countries of trade with developing countries such as China or Mexico has been an issue raised in both economic and populist circles in recent times . It is often alleged that trade with developing countries has had a significant impact on employment and wages (especially of unskilled labour) in the developed country due to this low cost competition. This may simply be due to having a large supply of unskilled labour or other factor endowment differences but it also often claimed that it is due to the lower environmental, safety and labour standards in the developing countries.
I do not intend to provide anything like a full review of an already extensive literature but rather a very brief summary. Similar can be found in [5] which provide a much more in depth guide to further reading than I shall. (Also see [2] in relation to environmental issue).
‘Overall the evidence suggests that trade sanctions are of limited but real effectiveness, and in this respect they are no different from other, more extreme forms of coercive action such as military force where the record of effectiveness is also extremely mixed.’ [1:423]. See also [6] ↩︎
‘Even in the presence of indeterminate welfare effects, free traders might still reject envrionmental trade measures on the basis that such measures, if widely permitted or entertained, would significantly erode the coherence and sustainability of rule-based liberal trade. . . This is based on the notion that the legal order of international trade is best understood as a set of rules and norms aimed as sustaining a long-term cooperative equilibrium, in the face of on-going pressures to cheat on the equilibrium, given that the short-term political pay-offs from cheating may be quite high (depending, of course, on the character and influence of protectionist interests within a particular country, the availability of alternative policies to deal with adjustment costs etc.). In the presence of fundamental normative dissensus as to what constitues ‘cheating’ on the one hand, and the punishment of other’s cheating on the other, confidence in the rules themselves could be fundamentally undermined, and the system destabilized.’ [1:428] ↩︎
In the construction of multilateral institutions to deal with environmental issues there are several important issues.