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	<title>Comments on: Argentina Extends Copyright Term in Recordings</title>
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		<title>By: Misc links &#171; Code and Culture</title>
		<link>http://rufuspollock.org/2010/01/14/argentina-extends-copyright-term-in-recordings/comment-page-1/#comment-162081</link>
		<dc:creator>Misc links &#171; Code and Culture</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 Jan 2010 09:22:13 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>&lt;p&gt;[...] Rufus Pollock uses the occasion of Argentinian copyright extension to take extremely long copyright terms to the woodshed. He shows that once you consider the decay in demand for cultural products (most of which are essentially ephemera) and net present value discounting, the marginal incentive effects of further extending already long copyright terms are absolutely infinitesimal. The most plausible alternative explanation is that extremely long copyright terms represents public choice more than public policy. Although he doesn’t say so, I think one obvious way to demonstrate this is that the extension is retroactive. Even if another twenty years is basically worthless in prospect to a new market entrant, it’s worth a lot to those incumbents who own those few works that have proven to be of lasting appeal. Also worth noting is that Pollock posts his code. [...]&lt;/p&gt;
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Rufus Pollock uses the occasion of Argentinian copyright extension to take extremely long copyright terms to the woodshed. He shows that once you consider the decay in demand for cultural products (most of which are essentially ephemera) and net present value discounting, the marginal incentive effects of further extending already long copyright terms are absolutely infinitesimal. The most plausible alternative explanation is that extremely long copyright terms represents public choice more than public policy. Although he doesn’t say so, I think one obvious way to demonstrate this is that the extension is retroactive. Even if another twenty years is basically worthless in prospect to a new market entrant, it’s worth a lot to those incumbents who own those few works that have proven to be of lasting appeal. Also worth noting is that Pollock posts his code. [...]</p>]]></content:encoded>
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